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THE MIRANDA WARNING
Frederick Schauer
I.

INTRODUCTION—ISOLATING MIRANDA’S IMPORT

Largely as a consequence of American television and movies,
Miranda v. Arizona1 may well be the most famous appellate case in the
world. On the screen, innumerable actors playing American police
officers give Miranda warnings to other actors playing suspects, a
portrayal that reflects the reality of genuine police officers giving
genuine Miranda warnings to genuine suspects millions of times every
year. Indeed, such has been the influence of Miranda that Russian
television cops give something like a Miranda warning to suspects even
though no actual Russian law imposes such an obligation on real
Russian cops.2 And it is said that in countries where no such right
actually exists, suspects have still been known, when arrested, to
demand their Miranda rights.3
Among the most interesting dimensions of Miranda’s worldwide
fame is that the case’s prominence is largely a function of the warning
itself.4 Television and motion pictures feature Miranda warnings not
because of any suspected viewer interest in whether suspects actually
have a right to remain silent,5 nor on account of the underlying substance
of the right to have a lawyer during interrogation,6 nor because the
 David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia; Visiting
Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. See Jennifer Ryan Tishler, Menty and the Petersburg Myth: TV Cops in Russia’s “Crime
Capital,” 10 J. CRIM. JUST. & POPULAR CULTURE 127, 138 (2003).
3. See NEAL STEPHENSON, IN THE BEGINNING . . . WAS THE COMMAND LINE 53–54 (1999).
4. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (noting that Miranda is “part of our
national culture”).
5. Although Miranda emphatically affirms the existence of a right to remain silent, 384 U.S. at
445–58, recognition of that right as a component of the Fifth Amendment—apart from the question
whether (and when) a suspect or defendant must be informed of the right—long predates Miranda.
See Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62, 63 (1949); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 262 U.S. 355, 359
(1923); see also Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). The most recent delineation of the scope
and limits of right to remain silent is Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010).
6. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964). On the right to counsel during
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general public is concerned about the right to appointed counsel for the
indigent.7 None of this, to put it mildly, makes for good theater. What is
good theater is the ritual of the arrest, and the Miranda warning,
typically given in almost exactly the terms set forth in the Supreme
Court’s opinion, is a prominent feature of the ritual, even apart from the
role that the warning is actually designed to serve.
Professor Kamisar—with his characteristic attention to detail in
support of spirited argument—provides an insightful judicial and
political history of the retrenching that has marked much of Miranda’s
history since the Supreme Court’s decision in 1966.8 In lamenting
Miranda’s erosion, I largely sympathize with Kamisar. But if there is a
worry about the erosion of Miranda,9 it must be a worry not about the
erosion of the right to remain silent itself, which existed independent of
Miranda,10 nor about the right to counsel during interrogation, whose
recognition and enforcement again preceded Miranda.11 Instead, it must
interrogation, and its relation to the right to remain silent, see Marcy Strauss, The Sounds of Silence:
Reconsidering the Right to Remain Silent Under Miranda, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 773, 817
(2009).
7. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
8. Yale Kamisar, The Rise, Decline, and Fall (?) of Miranda, 88 WASH. L. REV. 965 (2012).
9. Although I agree with much of Kamisar’s concerns about Miranda’s erosion, or shrinking, I
part company with his belief, expressed more insistently in Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth
Overruling (with Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1 (2010), that there is
something procedurally unusual and unfortunate in so-called stealth overruling. In a world of great
judicial candor, compare David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731
(1987), with Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 296 (1990). See generally Scott C.
Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1307 (1995); Symposium,
Tradeoffs of Candor: Does Judicial Transparency Erode Legitimacy?, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 443 (2009), the substantial erosion of Miranda by a Court unwilling to overrule it explicitly
might be a concern, but that is not our world. Thus, the same erosion-coupled-with-denial
phenomenon existed in, inter alia, the Supreme Court’s absurd claim in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 447 (1969), that it based its decision in large part on Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494 (1951), the Court’s effective but unacknowledged (until later, see Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S.
507 (1976)) overruling of Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
391 U.S. 308 (1968), in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), and, perhaps most
prominently, the erosion of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938), Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948), Sweatt v. Painter, 339
U.S. 629 (1950), and McLaurin v. Oklahoma, 339 U.S. 637 (1950). Although there is no article
precisely making such a claim, I would not be surprised to find that supporters of Plessy had, from
1938 until the Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), lamented the
“stealth overruling” of Plessy. Stealth overruling is now so common that it can hardly be considered
stealthy, and, moreover, seems to be a common way for the Court to diminish the import of an
unpopular precedent while waiting for the right political and legal environment to overrule it
explicitly.
10. See supra note 5.
11. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 727 (1963)
(noting unconstitutional absence of a “lawyer to advise Rideau of his right to stand mute”).
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be a worry about the requirement that the police provide a warning in a
certain way under certain conditions.12 Once we understand the import
of various pre-Miranda decisions, we can appreciate that Miranda is
about the warning itself, rather than about what the warning is a warning
of. And when we understand Miranda in this way, we can focus on just
what role the warning is designed to serve, and what the Court in
Miranda thought it was doing in specifying almost exactly the form that
the warning was to take. It is precisely this focus that will be the subject
of my attention in this Response.
In being about a warning, Miranda is about communication.
Specifically, it is about two different dimensions of communication. One
of these is the substance of Miranda’s holding, which is that police
officers are required—on pain of inadmissibility of the evidence
obtained absent a communication—to communicate to suspects under
certain conditions their right to remain silent, to have a lawyer present
for the interrogation, and to appointed counsel if they are indigent.13 And
the other communicative dimension of Miranda is the way in which the
Supreme Court communicated its requirements to police officers—the
primary subjects of the ruling—in extraordinarily clear and rule-like
terms. I will consider these two communicative dimensions in turn.
II.

MIRANDA AS RULE

Even before Miranda, involuntary confessions were plainly
understood to violate the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on compelled
self-incrimination and the Fourteenth Amendment’s guaranty of due
process.14 And even before Miranda, and still, suspects were and remain
permitted to waive their privilege against self-incrimination.15 In theory,
of course, the law might simply have prohibited self-incrimination,
making the questions of waiver and voluntariness irrelevant. Thus, in a
12. This is not to say that Kamisar and others might not also be concerned about a possible
erosion of the rights to remain silent and to counsel during interrogation. But although such
concerns might run parallel to the concerns about Miranda, and might be the product of a common
cause—decreasing Supreme Court and lower court sympathy with the rights of defendants in
criminal cases—they would neither run through Miranda nor, except in a much more complex and
attenuated way, be caused by any erosion of Miranda’s strength.
13. Miranda v. Arizona, 388 U.S. 443, 444–45 (1966).
14. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293
(1963); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1960);
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
15. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000); Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987);
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
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substantially more defendant-protective world—one that exists nowhere
in the real world as we know it—the law could simply require the police
to make their case against a suspect without the suspect’s assistance at
all, whether voluntary or not. Such an approach might be based on
dramatically different views of the nature of criminal prosecution than
the one that actually prevails in the United States and elsewhere.
Alternatively, and slightly more plausibly, the law might be based upon
a highly rule-based perspective on the realities of self-incrimination. Just
as the law of evidence prohibits the use of even probative character
evidence partially because of a fear of overvaluation or other misuse by
the jury,16 and just as First Amendment doctrine bars almost all forms of
viewpoint regulation in the public arena because of fears about the
dangers of allowing to government the power to draw viewpoint-based
distinctions,17 so too might a fear of the abuses of self-incrimination lead
to an admittedly and substantially over-inclusive prohibition on selfincrimination. Period. Such an approach would assuredly prevent the
misuse or over-use of self-incriminating statements, but would do so at a
price that no existing society appears willing to pay.18
However unrealistic a total prohibition on self-incrimination may be,
noting the possibility, even if only in theory, highlights the way in which
Miranda itself can be understood as a similarly rule-based strategy for
dealing with the problem of involuntary self-incrimination. Assuming
that involuntary self-incrimination is indeed a problem—and a wealth of
history and data supports the soundness of that assumption19—and
assuming that its total prohibition is understandably off the table,
Miranda emerges as a rule-like approach to dealing with the problem of
involuntary self-incrimination.20 The decision produces a rule designed
to address this problem, albeit a rule less stringent than total prohibition,
16. FED. R. EVID. 404; see Barrett J. Anderson, Note, Recognizing Character: A New Perspective
on Character Evidence, 121 YALE L.J. 1912 (2012); David P. Leonard, In Defense of the Character
Evidence Prohibition: Foundations of the Rule Against Trial By Character, 73 IND. L.J. 1161
(1998).
17. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Joseph
Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV. 695 (2011); Geoffrey R.
Stone, Anti-Pornography Legislation as Viewpoint-Discrimination, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 461
(1986).
18. Indeed, the conclusion in the text is implicit in the fact that, at least in the United States, a
simple requirement that a lawyer be present for any interrogation has never attracted significant
support. See Kamisar, supra note 8, at 1023.
19. See Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations,
34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3 (2010).
20. See Paul Marcus, It’s Not Just About Miranda: Determining the Voluntariness of Confessions
in Criminal Prosecutions, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 601, 643–44 (2006).
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less stringent than even a requirement that counsel be present at all
interrogations, and less stringent than even a requirement that counsel be
present for any valid waiver of the right to remain silent. Nevertheless, it
is important to remember that the underlying goal of the rule represented
by Miranda is to lessen involuntary self-incrimination. That is what lies
in the background of the entire debate. Genuinely voluntary selfincrimination remains constitutionally permissible, and thus
distinguishing genuinely voluntary self-incrimination from involuntary
self-incrimination, as well as guarding against involuntary selfincrimination, is the aim of this entire area of constitutional doctrine.21
Although Professor Kamisar and many others (including myself) decry
the old voluntariness test,22 it is important to bear in mind that
involuntariness is still the real concern. A test—or rule, if you will—is
different from a goal. If the involuntariness test is mistaken, which
Kamisar correctly thinks it is, it is not because we have identified the
wrong goal, but because the involuntariness test is a poor way of
implementing the involuntariness goal, for all of the reasons that
Kamisar persuasively explains.23
So if lessening or eliminating involuntary confessions—but not all
confessions and not even all non-counsel-advised confessions—is the
goal, it would then seem that the obvious solution would be to prohibit
exactly what we are concerned with. And, indeed, this was long the
approach, as exemplified in the voluntariness test and in a raft of preMiranda decisions.24 If involuntary confessions are the real danger, then
why not simply prohibit involuntary confessions, and prohibit using
their products? After all, in numerous other areas, the law directly
prohibits just what it wants to lessen. The prohibitions on murder, rape,
larceny, burglary, and the sale of narcotics, for example, are couched
almost completely and directly in the terms of the actual social concern.
Yet although such direct prohibitions are widespread, so too are less
direct ones. The immediate target of numerous legal prohibitions is
something other than, or something more than, exactly what the law
21. There are shades of difference among involuntariness, coercion, compulsion, and related
ideas, but sorting out the differences is far afield from the focus of this Response. It is worth noting,
however, that a careful examination of the very idea of coercion in all of its philosophical,
psychological, political, sociological, and economic dimensions—ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION
(1987), would be an excellent starting place—might usefully inform answering the question whether
the very idea of voluntariness best captures the important underlying concerns.
22. E.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865 (1981);
Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 102.
23. Kamisar, supra note 8, at 1025–32.
24. See cases cited in supra notes 5, 6, 10, 11.
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seeks to eliminate (or, at times, encourage). Such prohibitions, however,
must still be understood as but indirect approaches to serving the same
goal as direct ones. Prohibitions on possessing the instrumentalities of
crime—burglar tools25 or drug paraphernalia26—fit this mold, and in
many other domains legal goals are commonly embodied only indirectly,
and only probabilistically.27 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,28 for
example, is premised on the idea that true statements about public
officials (and, later, public figures29) should flourish and false ones
should not. The Sullivan rule is cruder, however, granting protection to
many false statements in order that the maximum number of true ones
will be published.30 Similarly, the Sherman Act seeks to prevent traderestraining business practices, but the various per se rules that the
Supreme Court has adopted to effectuate the Sherman Act’s deeper goals
are ones that may punish or deter non-trade-restraining practices in order
to accomplish the background goals most effectively.31 And among the
purposes of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act
25. The indirect nature of prohibitions on burglar tools is especially obvious when prosecutions
are aimed at the possession of individually benign items whose possession in combination is far
more suspicious. See, e.g., People v. O.M., No. H023435, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6565 (Cal.
Ct. App. July 16, 2002) (six broken spark plugs—commonly used for breaking glass silently);
People v. Trimmer, No. A095983, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6520 (Cal. Ct. App. July 15,
2002) (crowbar, hacksaw, and lock pick); Burgess v. Bintz, No. 00 CIV. 8271, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7168 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2002) (crowbar and bent coat hanger).
26. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5701(f)(12)(B) (L) (Supp. 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 60A-4403a (2010).
27. See Frederick Schauer, Bentham on Presumed Offences, 23 UTILITAS 363 (2011).
28. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
29. Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
30. See Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 301 (1971) (White, J., concurring). And
thus I agree with Kamisar and others, for example, Evan H. Caminker, Miranda and Some Puzzles
of “Prophylactic” Rules, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (2001); David Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution, and
Congress, 99 MICH. L. REV. 958 (2001), that the use of rules— rules simpliciter— is ubiquitous in
constitutional law, and that there is no special category of prophylactic rules. Every constitutional
rule, whether the rule emanating from Sullivan, or the four-part test for commercial speech
restrictions in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York,
447 U.S. 557 (1980), or the intermediate scrutiny rule for sex discrimination that protects men as
well as women, Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982), will encompass more than
would direct application of the rule embodied in the constitutional text, precisely because such overinclusion (as well as under-inclusion) is just how rules operate, and just what rules are. See
FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED
DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991) [hereinafter SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES].
The phrase “prophylactic rule” is accordingly best seen as a simple redundancy, sort of like “null
and void” or “cease and desist.”
31. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (price-fixing); Dr. Miles Med. Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (resale price maintenance), overruled by Leegin
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
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of 1934 is the prevention of trading on inside information, but Section
16(b) of the 1934 Act, rather than simply prohibiting insider trading,
penalizes (through civil liability) with a sharp-edged rule a wide swath
of so-called short-swing trades—most but not all of which will involve
the actual trading on inside information that is the statute’s real goal.32
And perhaps most pervasively, traffic laws aim to achieve safe driving
not simply by punishing unsafe or imprudent or unreasonable driving,
but by the use of crisply delineated speed limits, recognizing that such
limits may well over-deter some safe driving and under-deter some
unsafe driving.33
Viewed through this lens of indirect prohibitions in the service of a
goal that might be served less effectively with a direct prohibition, many
questions surrounding Miranda are now transformed. Professor Kamisar
sees the controversy about Miranda, and the ebbs and flows (mostly
ebbs) of its political and judicial history, largely in terms of a battle
between pro-police and pro-defendant (or, better, pro-defendants’ rights)
forces. In this he appears largely correct, but we need to examine more
carefully the missing steps that would support his conclusion. Just what
makes a direct prohibition on exactly what we are concerned with—a
straightforward prohibition on involuntary confessions—a pro-police
stance, and Miranda’s actual and indirect rule requiring disclosure a prodefendant or pro-rights one?
As with most rule-based approaches to more broadly defined
problems, the concern here is with mistakes in applying the broadly
phrased rule.34 More specifically, the concern about direct application of
a voluntariness standard is not just a replay of the traditional debates
between rules and standards.35 Rather, it is primarily a worry that
potential mistakes under a broadly worded standard would tilt
systematically in one direction rather than another—that involuntary
statements would be found to be voluntary far more often than voluntary
statements would be found to be involuntary. Indeed, such a skewing of
mistakes should not be surprising. It is a necessary characteristic of all
32. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (Supp. 2011).
33. See Robert E. King & Cass R. Sunstein, Doing Without Speed Limits, 79 B.U. L. REV. 155
(1999).
34. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO
LEGAL REASONING 13–35, 188–202 (2009) [hereinafter SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER];
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 30 passim.
35. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Rules, Standards, and Precautions in Payment Systems, 82 VA.
L. REV. 181 (1996); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557 (1992); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards
Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23 (2000).
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claimants of Miranda rights that they have at one point been suspects,
broadly defined, and it is a necessary characteristic of all claimants of
Miranda rights in court that they are defendants in criminal cases. And it
is a non-necessary but contingent truth that most criminal defendants are
guilty of the crimes with which they have been charged, and that many
of those who are not guilty of the crimes with which they are charged are
guilty of other crimes, crimes often identical to or resembling or
associated with the crimes with which they have been charged.36 Only
on television, in the movies, and in page-turner crime novels do totally
innocent individuals constitute a high percentage of the defendants in the
criminal cases that are brought to trial.
That most defendants are guilty does not suggest that a concern with
their rights is misguided.37 Even the guilty have rights to procedural
fairness. Moreover, the existence of procedural rights for the guilty
lessens the likelihood of prosecuting, convicting, and punishing the
innocent—as Blackstone and others recognized centuries ago.38 But the
fact that the bearers of defendants’ rights are systematically unappealing
individuals, largely because of their guilt, goes a long way towards
explaining a fear that the rights such individuals properly claim may be
under-recognized in practice. And thus, more specifically, the fact that
the confessions of those whose confessions may have been obtained by
trickery or even force have a substantial likelihood of actually being true
will make it predictably and systematically the case that such
involuntary confessions will be deemed voluntary far more often than
voluntary confessions will be found to be involuntary.39
36. This conclusion is an extrapolation from existing figures on guilty pleas (some of which will
admittedly be by innocent defendants) and on conviction rates at trial (some of which will be
erroneous), see THOMAS H. COHEN & TRACEY KYCELHAHN, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE
URBAN COUNTIES, 2006 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc06.pdf;
Felony
Defendants,
Summary
of
Findings,
BUREAU
JUST.
STAT.,
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=231 (last visited Feb. 23, 2013), but even the most
conservative extrapolation is sufficient to support the point in the text.
37. Gerard V. Bradley, Plea Bargaining and the Criminal Defendant’s Obligation to Plead
Guilty, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 65 (1999), supports the conclusion that most defendants are actually
guilty, but takes that conclusion as grounding an obligation on the part of guilty defendants to plead
guilty, a conclusion with which I disagree, even though I agree with Bradley’s factual premise.
38. “[I]t is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.” 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358. For interesting discussions and analysis of the Blackstonian
maxim and its historical and contemporary variants, see Larry Laudan, TRUTH, ERROR AND
CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY (2006); Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146
U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1997).
39. And thus Kamisar is correct to distinguish disapproval of police methods of obtaining a
confession from the unreliability of that confession. Kamisar, supra note 8, at 967. It is true that
involuntary confessions are less likely reliable than, say, contraband seized in violation of the
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Because the direct application of a vague voluntariness test will thus
result in errors of a systematically skewed variety, the attractiveness of a
rather more concrete—and thus error-minimizing40—rule becomes more
apparent. But why this rule? Why should the Constitution be interpreted
to require a warning, rather than a signed waiver, a witnessed waiver, an
attorney-advised waiver, a witnessed or recorded interrogation, or any of
some number of other devices that would more straightforwardly specify
and make more precise (more of a rule) the less precise (more of a
standard) idea of voluntariness?
It is not clear what the answer to this question is. Nor is it clear what
the Supreme Court in Miranda thought the answer was. It is also not
clear Kamisar has an answer either, except that he believes that at least
some of these remedies—mandatory attorney presence, for example—
would be politically impossible.41 But in his discussion of Mincey v.
Arizona,42 Kamisar does expose and discuss the weaknesses of the
voluntariness test in an environment in which case-by-case
determinations of voluntariness are logistically burdensome and likely to
be systematically skewed in the direction of excess deference to
determinations below.43 This is especially apparent in Mincey itself,
involving determinations made first by police officers, and then by
prosecutors, and then by elected trial judges, and then by elected state
appellate judges.44 One need not accuse any of these actors of bad faith
to suspect that all the incentives for all of them are in the direction of
Fourth Amendment, but only in the world of fantasy are all of the procedures we find morally or
constitutionally impermissible (or both) also ineffective. Torture is of course the obvious example,
but coerced confessions present the same issues. Indeed, although Kamisar is right to castigate the
inflammatory political rhetoric that followed Miranda, Kamisar, supra note 8, at 972–75, it seems
unlikely that the panoply of decisions protecting defendants’ rights would have no effect on the
crime-restricting abilities of the police and thus no effect on the crime rate. Obviously, sorting out
individual causal influences in a world of multiple causation is always difficult and often
impossible. Other factors—education, poverty, the general economic environment, and much else—
plainly influence the crime rate. Still, the rhetorical excesses of Senator McClennan, then-candidate
Nixon, and many others should not obscure the likelihood that making things marginally more
difficult for the police will make things marginally less difficult for those the police are attempting
to apprehend or restrict.
40. More precisely, a rule would be discretion-minimizing, and would thus lessen the errors
occasioned by misuse of that discretion. As with any rule, however, minimizing these errors would
be bought at the cost of increasing the number of errors of rule-dependent under-inclusion and overinclusion. See SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 30, at 149–55; SCHAUER, THINKING
LIKE A LAWYER, supra note 34, at 29–35.
41. Kamisar, supra note 8, at 1023.
42. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
43. Kamisar, supra note 8, at 968–70.
44. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 387–88.
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under-protecting Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Claiming to
be a stronger protector of Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights is
not, in general, a strategy designed to win elections for district attorney
or (elected) judge. And it is the rare police department that bases
promotion of its officers—short of behavior incurring civil liability—
very much on the vigor with which they guard the rights of suspects.
Yet even if the circumstances of Mincey underscore the need for a
rule-based approach, it is far less clear why the rule effectuating the goal
of voluntariness would focus on the warning, rather than on some crisp
indicator of voluntariness or involuntariness. We can understand
somewhat easily the relationship between the per se rule against price
fixing and the Sherman Act’s prohibition on contracts, combinations,
and conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce.45 And we can
understand (even if not necessarily agree with) the relationship between
a “best interests of the child” standard and its (historically) frequently
instantiating rule creating a strong presumption in favor of granting
custody to the mother.46 But the relationship between the voluntariness
idea and the rule in Miranda seems somewhat less direct and thus
somewhat harder to tease out.
Typically, rules use statistically reliable instantiations of their
background justifications as their operative triggers, as with the
operative trigger of a numerical speed limit, which is a statistically
reliable but not perfect instantiation of unsafe driving. These operative
triggers are the imperfect but probabilistically useful indicators of the
furtherance of their background justifications. Price-fixing typically but
not necessarily indicates a hindrance (restraint) of trade; and,
historically, maternal custody was a statistically reliable indicator of
furthering a child’s best interests. In the context of Miranda, therefore,
the claim would be that receiving a warning—which is what Miranda
requires and what makes the case distinctive—is a statistically reliable
indicator that a subsequent waiver was voluntary. This may well be true,
but note that it does require a series of inferential links—from a
suspect’s receipt of the warning to the suspect’s appreciating the content
of the warning to the suspect’s recognizing that waivers are not required
to the suspect signing a waiver voluntarily. Each of these steps may well
be statistically justified, but it is hardly obvious that they are. Indeed,
there is some indication that one or more may not be.47 Consequently, if
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
46. See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition of Gender in the Law: Revaluing the
Caretaker Role, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1 (2008).
47. See Kassin et al., supra note 19.
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genuine voluntariness is the background justification, and if we
understand, as we should, that background justifications may often be
better served by crisp and probabilistically reliable instantiations than by
direct application of the background justification, it is hardly obvious
that picking the providing of a warning is the best or the most
statistically reliable way of instantiating the background concern with
voluntariness.
Thus, it is important to distinguish two different possible concerns
about voluntariness. One is that voluntariness is simply the wrong
idea—that voluntariness as the background goal is itself misguided. But
this seems not to be Kamisar’s concern, nor that of other defenders of
Miranda. And thus the second concern, which does appear to be
Kamisar’s, is that voluntariness may be a sufficiently slippery standard
such that courts, in applying it directly, will be especially inclined to find
against a defendant for any of a number of reasons.48 If this is so,
however, and I believe it to be so, and if voluntariness remains as the
appropriate background justification even if not the appropriate
instantiating rule, then there needs to be some indication that some other
instantiating rule is less prone to mistakes in application while still being
a serviceable instantiation of the background justification. Kamisar and
others are persuasive in showing us why and how Miranda satisfies the
former—how it might be less prone to skewed mistakes in application.49
But the defenders of Miranda have focused less than they should on
demonstrating why the Miranda instantiation of the voluntariness
background justification is more statistically well-tailored to serving the
background justification than might some number of other similarly
mistake-avoiding instantiations. We can be confident that some indicia
of voluntariness—signing a waiver, for example—may be quite poor
indicators of voluntariness, and even less statistically reliable than a
Miranda warning. But what remains to be shown is that a Miranda
warning, even when coupled with a voluntariness backup,50 is a better
rule than some number of alternatives. Perhaps it is, but the best defense
of Miranda will recognize that compliance with Miranda may be an
attenuated indicator of voluntariness, and that non-compliance may be
an attenuated indicator of involuntariness. Without responding to this
concern, the defenders of Miranda may wind up offering simple prorights versus pro-police arguments that will fail to persuade anyone on
48. Kamisar, supra note 8, at 967–70.
49. Kamisar, supra note 8, at 1026–38.
50. See United States v. Plugh, 576 F.3d 135, 144 (2d Cir. 2009) (Miranda warnings given, but
subsequent statements excluded as involuntary).
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the other side.
III. MIRANDA AS GUIDANCE
It is thus at least arguable that Miranda is a coarse and clumsy
instantiation of the deeper behavior—genuine voluntariness—that the
Miranda rule is designed to indicate. But Miranda may fare somewhat
better when we turn to a different aspect of its communicative
dimension. That is, Miranda may be of questionable effectiveness in
conveying to courts and others the behavior that the Miranda warning is
designed to indicate. But the case may be considerably more effective in
conveying from courts, and in particular from the Supreme Court, the
behavior that is required of primary actors.
Thus, the Court—having decided that the appropriate way of
guaranteeing genuine voluntariness in waivers, as well as of simply
assuring that suspects know of their Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights51—might simply have ruled that suspects must be adequately
apprised of their rights. Had this been the outcome of Miranda or of a
Miranda-like case, courts would then be required to assess whether
some notification to suspects of their rights was sufficiently adequate, in
much the same way that courts assess reasonableness or adequacy or
satisfaction of some other largely indeterminate standard in numerous
other areas of law, particularly constitutional law.52
The Supreme Court, as we know, did not take that course. Instead it
came very close to mandating the exact script that the police were to use
in communicating with suspects.53 Indeed, it is just this dimension of
Miranda that has played such a large role in ensuring the case’s iconic
status. Were police notifications less formulaic, Miranda warnings
would make far worse theater. It is precisely the fact that most real
police officers and most movie and television police officers say exactly
51. That is, there is presumably a value in people knowing what the law is, and knowing what
their rights are, independent of that knowledge’s instrumental value in fostering insistence on those
rights or in deterring rights-restricting official behavior.
52. Examples are legion, but a list of the most prominent ones would include the determination
whether a state law is sufficiently rational or reasonable to survive minimal due process or equal
protection scrutiny (Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483 (1955)), whether a restriction
on abortion places an undue burden on a woman’s ability to choose (Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S.
914 (2000); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)), whether government
entanglement with religion is excessive (Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)), or whether
alternative forums for communication (United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983)) or raising
claims (South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367 (1984)) are adequate.
53. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–73 (1966). See also id. at 444, where the Court notes
that it is setting forth the requirements with “some specificity.”

11 - Schauer Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

2013]

THE MIRANDA WARNING

3/13/2013 6:59 PM

167

the same thing at roughly the same time in the arrest sequence which
makes Miranda so memorable. The so-called Miranda card is pretty
close to the inscribed text of a Supreme Court opinion, and thus we have
a situation in which the Supreme Court is giving direct and explicit
guidance to primary actors—police officers—on how to behave and how
to comply with the Court’s ruling.
This approach is, to put it mildly, rare. With annoying frequency, the
Supreme Court chooses vagueness over specificity, preferring, it seems,
to keep its options open for future cases rather than give clear guidance
now, even if in doing so it admittedly constrains itself in the future.54
The Court has not, for example, told trial judges or litigants what is
necessary in order for an expert witness to be qualified as such or expert
evidence to be admissible. Instead it has elected to list a series of factors,
leaving unspecified which factors are individually necessary, and how
many factors (and in what combination) are sufficient.55 Much the same
applies to the Court’s non-specification in any useful detail of what
counts as “testimonial” for purposes of the Confrontation Clause,56 or of
which forms of student speech teachers and school administrators must
allow in order to comply with the First Amendment,57 or of which
Christmas displays will violate the Establishment Clause.58
All of these examples are ones, like the interrogations at issue in
Miranda, in which the Court is assuredly speaking to vast numbers of
primary actors encountering constitutionally precarious events on a daily
basis. Where the Court is speaking only to Congress, say, and only with
respect to relatively uncommon occurrences—most separation of powers
controversies fit this description59—to say nothing of almost unique

54. I have discussed this on several previous occasions, albeit not in the context of Miranda. See
Frederick Schauer, Abandoning the Guidance Function: Morse v. Frederick, 2007 SUP. CT. REV.
205 [hereinafter Schauer, Abandoning the Guidance Function]; Frederick Schauer, Opinions as
Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1455 (1995); see also Frank Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court,
95 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1982).
55. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
56. See Williams v. Illinois, 564 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012); Bullcoming v. New Mexico,
564 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011); Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011);
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009); Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008);
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
57. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); see Schauer, Abandoning the Guidance Function,
supra note 54.
58. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
59. E.g., Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361
(1989); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); United
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scenarios such as that in Bush v. Gore60—there might be little need for
the Court to provide direct guidance. Case-by-case determination in such
contexts is manageable, the costs of rule-based errors are large, and the
advantages of rules in providing predictability for hundreds or thousands
or more primary actors are largely beside the point.
By contrast, in a context in which a Supreme Court decision deals
with an issue arising thousands of times a year, or, as with Miranda,
thousands of times a day throughout the United States, and in which the
Supreme Court itself hears only about eighty cases a year and even the
federal courts of appeals and the state appellate courts are heavily overburdened, one might expect the Court to be more concerned than it now
is or has been for years with providing direct and thus litigationforestalling guidance. From this perspective, Miranda and the “Miranda
card” are noteworthy outliers.
The Miranda approach to guidance—detailed and specific guidance
aimed at primary actors—does not come without costs. Indeed, the
strongest argument for the opposite approach is that such guidance is too
Procrustean, forcing a wide diversity of behavior into a distortingly
narrow model. There are, to use the examples above, wide varieties of
expertise and expert evidence, statements to police officers, Christmas
displays, and student speech. To attempt to lay down in advance—
concretely and specifically—the appropriate way of dealing with this
diversity of behavior is inevitably to commit to making and tolerating
some number of mistakes in application.
So too, it might be argued, with rights notifications to suspects. Some
suspects will be more able to understand the meaning and import of the
typical Miranda warning, and others less. Some situations will make a
warning relatively easy, and others will be very difficult. To attempt in
advance to deal with all of these diverse situations with a standard onesize-fits-all warning is destined to failure. Or so it could be argued.
This objection is in one sense sound. For the Supreme Court to give
this kind of detailed guidance to police departments and officers about
constitutionally permissible police behavior would run the risk of some
number of “mistakes.” In some cases, compliance with the precise
Miranda strictures would produce at least presumptive legal and
constitutional permissibility even though the warning might not be fully
adequate to apprise suspects of their rights. And in others non-

States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952).
60. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). Similarly likely non-repeatable and rare is Nixon, 418 U.S. 683.
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compliance would produce unconstitutionality and consequent exclusion
even though the non-complying warning would actually have provided
the information sufficient to provide some suspect with everything he or
she needed to understand their rights and then decide knowingly whether
to waive them or not.
Such suboptimal outcomes in individual cases, however, are an
inevitable part of any process of rule-based decision-making.61 The real
question, then, is whether custodial interrogation represents a context in
which the advantages of rule-based decision-making and rule-based
guidance—notice, predictability, constraint on discretion, and the like—
outweigh the principal disadvantage of under- and over-inclusion vis-àvis the rule’s background justification. And in this context there is a
strong argument that the advantages of crisp rules outweigh the
disadvantages. We are dealing with a very frequent and repeatable event,
and one in which the primary actors—the interrogating police officers—
are typically not themselves legally trained, nor do they often have
access to legal advice at the time of making a decision with
constitutional implications. And we are dealing with a situation in which
the incentives of those primary actors diverge substantially from the
incentives of those—the courts, principally—who are primarily charged
with the protection of constitutional rights. As such, custodial
interrogation—along with many other street-level police practices—
represents a situation in which notice, consistency, and predictability are
likely more important than the flexibility to deal with currently
unimagined situations. All of these considerations thus point in the
direction of a rule-based approach. Consequently, we can see not only
the Miranda warning itself as a rule, but also the Supreme Court’s
decision in Miranda about what the warning should say as a rule, albeit
one made and implemented at a different level.
CONCLUSION
My differences with Professor Kamisar are slight. But there are
differences in tone that are worth noting. For Kamisar, Miranda’s
subsequent history is a proxy for a larger and deeper battle between propolice and pro-defendants’ rights forces.62 Kamisar sees himself, the
Miranda majority, and the post-Miranda advocates of Miranda
preservation as belonging to the latter side in this battle, with the
Miranda dissenters—the judicial Miranda skeptics such as Chief
61. See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983).
62. And perhaps between liberals and conservatives. See Kamisar, supra note 8, at 976.
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Justices Burger and Rehnquist, and scholars such as Fred Inbau—all
belonging to the former.63
In drawing the battle lines in this way, Kamisar has tapped into a
genuine judicial and constitutional division, one that has occasionally—
as in the 1968 election—erupted into the political arena. But Miranda’s
virtues are not just that it is a marker for one side of a longstanding
debate, standing alongside Mapp v. Ohio,64 Gideon v. Wainwright,65 and
a host of other Warren-era decisions which properly, in my view, reflect
the way in which rights protected under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments cannot plausibly, because of the systematic
unattractiveness of those who claim and defend them, be protected other
than by strong and unpopular judicial intervention. Rather, Miranda is
also important for the way in which it embodies the Supreme Court’s
occasional but increasingly rare willingness to understand its role as lawmaker, rule-maker, and promulgator of standards of conduct for primary
and constitutionally constrained actors. Recognizing Miranda’s
substantive outcome with respect to an important dimension of modern
American constitutional criminal procedure is important. But so too is
recognizing the importance of Miranda in demonstrating—as postMiranda popular culture has made clear—that the Supreme Court has
the capacity to give clear and crisp instructions to the primary actors
whose constitutional compliance is essential to a constitutional system.
Would that the Court do so more often.

63. In light of his larger story, and the roles played by the principal characters in it, Kamisar
struggles to make sense of Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). Kamisar, supra note 8,
at 1002–08. But it is probably best simply to understand Dickerson as a skirmish in an entirely
different battle, a battle in which Chief Justice Rehnquist is best seen as carrying the judicial
supremacy banner of Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), Nevada Department of Human Resources
v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), among others cases,
against the departmentalists and popular constitutionalists. Compare Larry Alexander & Frederick
Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997)
(defending judicial supremacy), with Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution:
Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2003) (decrying judicial supremacy). However one
comes out on these debates, it should be clear that any debate that puts Abraham Lincoln, Edwin
Meese, Larry D. Kramer (We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001)), and Michael Stokes Paulsen
(The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L. J. 217 (1994))
on one side and Chief Justice Rehnquist and a unanimous Warren Court (in Cooper) on the other
defies conventional political categorization. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Defending
Judicial Supremacy, 17 CONST. COMM. 455 (2000). And thus Dickerson is probably best understood
as having remarkably little to do with Miranda at all.
64. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
65. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

